Britannia Is Naked, Helpless, And Unable To Defend Herself

The UK has not been this strategically exposed since before the Napoleonic Wars.
Certainly not in the 20th or 19th centuries. Possibly not since the mid-18th century. Our situation is perilous, and it is not hyperbole to say so. Historians, defence analysts, and even former Chiefs of the Defence Staff have explicitly said versions of the same thing.

Our Perilous Descent into Military Irrelevance

In a grey November morning, members of Parliament filed into Committee Room 14 to receive a document few had expected would contain such bleak conclusions. The Commons Defence Committee's report on Britain's contribution to European security landed with the force of a diplomatic crisis.

We question the Ministry of Defence's ability to protect the UK and the Overseas Territories from crisis or conflict.

The understatement was deliberate. The reality was considerably worse.

For the first time since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Britain faces a predicament so severe it borders on the existential: the nation cannot defend itself. Not in some abstract, theoretical sense. Not as a matter of degree or preparedness. In concrete, measurable terms, the United Kingdom lacks the industrial capacity, military mass, homeland defence infrastructure, and strategic readiness to protect its population from attack. The committee heard evidence about scenarios most Britons might assume belong to works of fiction. They do not.

It's hard to understate how bad it is, but they managed it/

Professor Peter Roberts, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, delivered testimony so stark it seemed designed to shatter complacency.

There has been no political will to make the difficult decisions, or to be honest with the public and say, 'We're not going to stop missiles coming and hitting you. A set of you are going to die, hospitals are going to go under, and you will be without food, water, sewers and electricity.'

He continued:

We have not been brave enough to tell the public what happens in Israel every day is a realistic scenario for London, Manchester, Edinburgh or Inverness tomorrow. The enemy has the capability and the intent to do this, and is actively considering it.

This was not hyperbole. Roberts was describing the professional assessment of what Russia could achieve if it chose to test British defences with conventional missiles, not nuclear ones. The answer, according to multiple defence experts who testified, is simple and terrifying: next to nothing stands in the way.

The Full Arsenal: Britain's Military Capability in Numbers

To understand the true scale of Britain's defence crisis requires examining the complete inventory of what the nation can actually field. The numbers reveal a military establishment stretched beyond sustainable limits, operating equipment at rates of availability bordering on dysfunction, and lacking the mass to conduct operations beyond the most modest scale.

The Army: Smallest Since Napoleon

The British Army currently maintains slightly more than 70,000 fully trained soldiers—the smallest fighting force since the Napoleonic wars ended in 1815. The official target, revised downward in 2021, stands at 73,000. To contextualise: during the Cold War, the British Army of the Rhine alone numbered 55,000 personnel. The entire current Army could fit, with room to spare, into the force structure Britain maintained in West Germany to counter the Soviet threat.

When asked about rapid reaction capability, Dr Robert Johnson estimated the UK could likely deploy 2,000 soldiers, 5 to 6 ships, and 30 aircraft. This represents roughly 3% of the Army's trained strength—a figure suggesting the remaining 97% are either committed to other tasks, in training, on leave, or required for force rotation and sustainability.

The equipment situation reflects similar constraints. The Challenger 2 tank fleet, subject to upgrade programmes, faces questions about numbers and availability. Artillery capabilities centre on 155mm guns requiring ammunition Britain cannot currently manufacture domestically at scale. Armoured vehicle fleets show their age, whilst promised modernisation programmes stretch timelines into the 2030s.

The Royal Navy: Half a Fleet

The Royal Navy operates two aircraft carriers—HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales—representing on paper a formidable power projection capability. In practice, one carrier is frequently in dock for repairs or maintenance, meaning Britain can reliably deploy only a single carrier at any given time.

The Type 45 destroyer fleet numbers exactly six vessels. These destroyers, equipped with the Sea Viper missile system, represent Britain's primary defence against incoming ballistic missiles. Each Type 45 can protect an entire city. The problem: as of August 2025, three were languishing in Portsmouth docks undergoing repairs. In 2021, ministers admitted to the defence committee only one Type 45 was match-fit—a situation MPs branded "operationally unacceptable."

The frigate situation proves equally dire. Two frigates, HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll, are being mothballed before replacements arrive from 2026 due to chronic sailor shortages. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the Navy's support arm providing replenishment and logistics, has much of its fleet stuck in port unable to sail.

The submarine force—Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent and attack capabilities—suffers from what evidence described as "chronically poor availability." Exact numbers of operational attack submarines remain classified, but references to availability issues suggest a significant portion of the fleet is non-operational at any given moment.

Carlos Del Toro, the US Navy Secretary, publicly called for the UK to reassess the size of its armed forces, an extraordinary intervention from an ally highlighting the severity of the capability gap.

The Royal Air Force: Waiting for Tomorrow

The RAF faces its own capability challenges, with personnel numbers 9% below the target set in 2015. The F-35B Lightning fleet represents Britain's newest combat aircraft, but integration of UK weapons systems faces extensive delays. The Meteor missile won't be integrated until the early 2030s. The Spear Capability 3 air-to-surface weapon remains under review, with in-service capability—if approved—unlikely before the 2030s. This means the only sovereign missile system currently able to be carried by the F-35B is the ASRAAM short-range air-to-air missile.

Compare this to Israel, which has integrated domestically-produced electronic warfare systems, sensors, and communications technology onto its F-35 variant. Britain, despite being a partner in the F-35 programme from inception, cannot field its own weapons on its newest aircraft for another decade.

The Typhoon fleet provides the backbone of air defence and strike capability. The recent announcement of 20 Typhoon sales to Turkey, with first deliveries expected in 2030, was presented as securing 20,000 jobs—an admission the production line faced closure without export orders. The defence committee previously highlighted concerns about the gap between Typhoon and the future GCAP (Global Combat Air Programme) aircraft, warning of losing "the industrial capacity to design and manufacture combat aircraft within the UK."

The SkySabre air defence system, announced for expansion in the Strategic Defence Review, provides mobile land-based air defence for key sites. The number of launchers and their coverage remains limited compared to European allies investing in integrated air and missile defence.

Wedgetail Early Warning aircraft, also announced for purchase, will improve threat detection. The number of aircraft and timeline for operational deployment were not specified in evidence to the committee.

Personnel Crisis Across All Services

Royal Navy personnel numbers stand 5% below the target set in 2015. RAF numbers are 9% below target. The Army is only meeting its revised target because the target was slashed to 73,000—the actual number of trained personnel hovers around 70,000.

On a net basis, 5,790 people left the armed forces in the year to 30 September 2023. Army and navy recruitment targets have been missed every year since 2010. Since Capita took over the army recruitment contract in 2012, the total recruitment shortfall exceeds 23,000 personnel.

The reasons compound: pay stagnation (capped at 1% between 2013 and 2018), substandard housing (nearly a third needing repair), documented sexism and harassment, and questions about the morality of recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military pay has lagged civilian sector growth, and the 2024 pay rise of 5% plus £1,000 came only after years of below-inflation increases.

Nuclear Deterrent: The Last Pillar

Britain's nuclear deterrent remains the one area of unquestioned capability. The Vanguard-class submarine fleet maintains continuous at-sea deterrence, with one boat always on patrol carrying Trident missiles. The Strategic Defence Review reaffirmed commitment to the nuclear deterrent and announced the purchase of 12 F-35A aircraft to join NATO's nuclear sharing mission—a decision expanding Britain's nuclear posture beyond the submarine-based deterrent.

However, even here questions emerge. Professor Sir Andrew Dorman of King's College London questioned whether "a single nuclear boat at sea would be insufficient to deter both Russia and China," suggesting investment in a second delivery method might be necessary. The Government dismissed this option without detailed public explanation, preferring instead to join NATO's tactical nuclear mission.

The Dreadnought-class submarines, replacing the Vanguard boats, remain under construction. The programme faces the productivity challenges affecting the entire defence nuclear enterprise, though the Government says it committed to removing barriers across the nuclear supply chain. Hint: quangoes, again.

Reserves and Mobilisation: The Forgotten Force

The Reserve forces—Army Reserve, Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve, and RAF Reserve—provide theoretically a pool of trained personnel for mobilisation. The actual numbers, readiness levels, and integration with regular forces received scant attention in evidence to the defence committee. References to mobilisation appeared in the context of the Home Defence Programme and the proposed, unwritten Defence Readiness Bill, but specific Reserve force capabilities and deployment timelines were not addressed.

The lack of discussion about Reserve forces suggests either they are not considered relevant to current planning or their state does not bear scrutiny. Historical precedent shows effective use of Reserves requires extensive advance planning, regular training, and integration with regular forces—all of which require resources and attention largely absent from current defence policy discussions.

Strategic Enablers: The Critical Gaps

Beyond platforms and personnel, modern warfare requires what NATO terms "strategic enablers"—capabilities allowing forces to operate effectively. Dr Robert Johnson told the committee the UK had worked on the assumption

if anything really serious happened, the rest of NATO would come along and provide those supports and facilities.

These enablers include:

• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities
• Space-based assets for communications and targeting
• Electronic warfare systems
• Strategic air and sea lift for moving forces
• Air-to-air refuelling allowing aircraft to operate at extended ranges
• Command, control and communications infrastructure

Dr Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer of the German Marshall Fund explained Europeans are

hyper-dependent on the United States in critical areas such as intel, satellites, transportation of troops and air-to-air refuelling.

She estimated some capability gaps could be filled within three years, but Europeans needed to invest now to build capacity within five years.

The UK possesses capabilities in some of these areas—the announcement of additional Wedgetail early warning aircraft addresses ISR gaps, and Britain maintains space sector capabilities. However, the scale remains inadequate for independent operations. The Strategic Defence Review identified AI and Space as areas where the UK should invest and strengthen ties with partners, acknowledging current shortfalls whilst promising future development.

Readiness and Sustainability: The Hidden Multiplier

Raw platform numbers tell only part of the story. Readiness—the proportion of equipment operational and available for deployment—determines actual capability. The Type 45 destroyer fleet provides the clearest example: six hulls, but only two or three operational at any moment, reducing effective strength by half.

This pattern repeats across services. Aircraft require maintenance, reducing available numbers. Ships need docks and repairs. Vehicles wear out. Munitions deplete. Modern complex equipment demands extensive support infrastructure, skilled technicians, spare parts, and time.

The defence committee heard evidence about "in-year pressures on budgets at a crucial time of preparation to meet potential conflict." These pressures force choices between immediate readiness and long-term capability development. Money spent keeping current equipment operational cannot be invested in new systems. Personnel retained for essential tasks cannot receive training on new technologies.

Sustainability—the ability to maintain operations over time—presents even greater challenges. Dr Rowan Allport described how the UK had relied on the US as a munitions "storage bin" rather than holding sufficient domestic stockpiles. Without domestic production at scale, any sustained operation depletes irreplaceable stocks. The commitment to build six munitions factories by 2029 addresses this, but the timeline means Britain operates with critical vulnerabilities for another four years minimum.

The Uncomfortable Arithmetic

When questioned about whether the UK could sustain itself in a conflict on its own, the answer emerges from simple arithmetic.

1. An army of 70,000 cannot simultaneously defend the homeland, maintain overseas garrisons, honour NATO commitments, and conduct expeditionary operations.
2. A navy with effectively three operational destroyers cannot protect shipping lanes, maintain carrier battle groups, and defend home waters.
3. An air force unable to arm its newest aircraft with domestically-produced weapons cannot operate independently of allies.

Who could the UK survive an invasion by, and who could it not? Taking NATO out of the equation, as requested, reveals the answer.

Against any peer or near-peer adversary operating without alliance constraints, Britain's current force structure, equipment availability, munitions stocks, and personnel numbers prove insufficient for sustained independent operations.

The defence committee heard this assessment repeatedly, though expressed more diplomatically. Dr Robert Johnson's estimate of 2,000 deployable soldiers speaks volumes. The acknowledgement Britain cannot meet its NATO Article 3 commitments—to maintain and develop capacity to resist armed attack—confirms it. The admission the UK has "next to nothing" in integrated air and missile defence eliminates doubt.

Britain retains a nuclear deterrent, world-class special forces, excellence in specific niches, and the institutional knowledge of a professional military. What it lacks is mass, sustainability, industrial capacity, and the full spectrum of capabilities required for independent action. The numbers, examined honestly, admit no other conclusion.

The Vanishing of Industrial Britain

The crisis begins not on battlefields but in blast furnaces and factory floors. For the first time in a generation, Britain will mass-manufacture explosives domestically. The Ministry of Defence has earmarked at least 13 sites across the UK for potential munitions and "energetics" factories—facilities to produce high explosives, rocket propellants and ignition systems at scale. Defence Secretary John Healey announced plans to create an "always on" munitions pipeline, with construction of the first sites expected to begin in 2026.

This might sound like progress. It is, in fact, an admission of catastrophic vulnerability.

The fact Britain must rebuild from scratch the capacity to produce basic military explosives reveals how thoroughly the defence industrial base has been hollowed out. For two decades, the country has sourced these materials from overseas, primarily the United States and France. The UK cannot currently manufacture, in sufficient quantity, the RDX explosive used in 155mm rounds for British Army guns. Shipping containers are being erected at defence facilities across the UK to house new production lines—a temporary fix whilst permanent infrastructure is constructed.

The Steel Industry (Special Measures) Act 2025 prevented the pre-emptive closure of the UK's last remaining domestic steel blast furnace. Consider what this means: without emergency legislation, Britain would have possessed no capacity whatsoever to smelt virgin steel. Every warship, every armoured vehicle, every piece of military infrastructure would require imported materials. In any sustained conflict, or in circumstances where supply chains face disruption, this dependency becomes fatal.

BAE Systems, the UK's primary defence contractor, submitted evidence describing "low rate" defence production resulting from decades of underinvestment. The industrial base centralised and reduced capacity whilst supply chains rationalised, creating bottlenecks and long lead times with few alternative options available. Meanwhile, demand remained "disaggregated and is slow to translate into orders." The result: an industrial ecosystem unable to respond to wartime demands.

The defence committee heard repeatedly about the imbalance between demand and supply. In April 2025, the then Chief of Defence Staff explained to the Public Accounts Committee the rising cost of 155mm shells—prices had increased substantially in three years as countries bid against each other to supply Ukraine. The former Chief concluded the only sustainable solution was investing to increase industrial capacity. Without expanded production capacity across small companies through to large contractors, increased defence spending simply produces inflation rather than capability.

The Munitions Desert

Britain's inability to produce munitions at scale means the country has become dependent on what Dr Allport described as the US acting as a munitions "storage bin" rather than holding sufficient stockpiles domestically. Recent reports suggest the US may prove less inclined to sell munitions in future as the Administration deals with its own shortages. Kevin Craven of ADS identified this as the "biggest critical area", noting it would require the whole of Europe to produce the equivalent of US supply.

The scale of the gap becomes apparent when examining specific weapons systems. As previously noted, the F-35B, Britain's newest fighter jet, faces delays in integrating UK munitions. The Meteor missile integration has been pushed to the early 2030s. The Spear Capability 3 air-to-surface weapon remains under review, with in-service capability—if the programme proceeds—unlikely before the 2030s. This means the only sovereign missile system currently able to be carried by the F-35B is the ASRAAM.

Without published demand signals, industry cannot invest to increase capacity. The say-do gap between rhetoric and MoD spending continues.

The Homeland Defence Vacuum

Article 3 of the NATO Treaty requires member states to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." In July 2025, the then Minister for the Armed Forces told the defence committee:

Article 3 has not been upheld in the way we would like it to be... we have been very clear we are not satisfied with Article 3 in the UK.

Britain lacks a national defence plan. Sky News reported in April 2024 the UK had no such plan—no "war book" setting out what the nation expects to need for defence and what it can provide to NATO. Dr Robert Johnson of Oxford University, formerly head of the Secretary of State's Office for Net Assessment in the Ministry of Defence, recounted how a cross-departmental wargame highlighted numerous issues.

The Cabinet Office committed to providing a national plan by November 2024. That deadline passed. Again.

The Home Defence Programme, led by the Cabinet Office, remains "internal-to-government" and will not be published. Quelle surprise.

The Strategic Defence Review recommended the MOD ensure:

plans made under the Home Defence Programme meet Defence's needs in the event of escalation to war, including mobilisation of Reserves and industry, and ensuring Defence has ready access to private-sector infrastructure for operations.

The MoD describes this as "an evolving and enduring programme of work."

The decision not to communicate the programme's intent and contents beyond Government suggests authorities do not treat the public, industry or civil society as partners in delivering outcomes. This contradicts the Government's own Resilience Action Plan, which acknowledges:

government cannot do it alone. Resilience has to be a shared responsibility between individuals, communities, businesses, local, devolved and national government, and public services across the UK.

No. It isn't.

Dr Johnson criticised the decision not to share information with the public, suggesting there ought to be a public-facing document alongside any classified plans. He questioned the efficacy of current enablers of resilience, pointing to the Emergency Alert phone system and the Government 'Prepare' website:

There is a website page dedicated to what the public should do in the event of an emergency. The problem there is in the event of an emergency, the first thing you are probably going to lose is your electricity and, therefore, I suspect, your ability to read a website.

Quite.

The Missile Defence Chasm

Professor Roberts warned the defence committee about the proliferation of air and missile threats. What exists today represents capabilities in some form for decades, but what has changed is "speed, scale and mass." Faster and more capable missiles are being used more often by a wider range of actors. He pointed to regular use of ballistic missiles in Ukraine and sophisticated technologies deployed by the Houthis—a non-state actor—to target Saudi Arabia's critical national infrastructure.

Europe faces significant shortfalls in Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities on land and at sea, compounded by lack of common architecture for integration of air and missile defence systems across the continent. Germany, Norway, Sweden, Spain and Italy have invested in parts of IAMD in recognition of the threat. Professor Roberts told the committee:

The UK by comparison has next to nothing.

Britain possesses no US-style Patriot missile interceptor batteries. Countries such as Poland and Romania, which feel the Russian threat more acutely, now possess "hugely credible integrated air and missile defence capability against the Russians."

Britain has no equivalent to Israel's Iron Dome missile shield. Instead, the main defence for incoming ballistic missiles has been the Royal Navy's Type 45 Destroyers, equipped with the Sea Viper missile system. Capable of hitting a cricket ball-sized object travelling at Mach 3, this state-of-the-art weapon can take down everything from drones to jet fighters and protect an entire city. If we could pay for it.

The problem: Britain only has six Type 45 Destroyers—enough, theoretically, to protect the capital and a few key military installations, but not much more. A dozen Type 45s were originally commissioned in the late 1990s, but the order was slimmed down post-9/11 when the Government felt the main security threats were terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. The fleet is barely half-operational, thanks to ongoing glitches in design. As of August 2025, three Type 45s were languishing in Portsmouth docks for repairs. In 2021, ministers admitted only one Type 45 was match-fit—a situation MPs branded "operationally unacceptable."

The Sky News podcast The Wargame simulated how real-life politicians would respond during a conventional Russian attack on the UK. Former defence secretary Sir Ben Wallace and former foreign secretary Jack Straw were horrified to learn that, because Britain had only one Type 45 destroyer at sea, they would have to choose between protecting Whitehall or protecting military assets. Former Royal Navy captain Gerry Northwood observes:

We would have a Hobson's choice: protect London or other cities, or protect a naval taskforce. We'd have very difficult choices, with very few assets to distribute.

The Strategic Defence Review announced plans to purchase additional SkySabre Air Defence launchers—mobile, land-based air defence systems designed to protect key sites from aircraft and drone attacks. The Government is also purchasing additional Wedgetail Early Warning aircraft to improve threat detection. Long term, however, defence analysts believe Britain needs what they nickname the "Lion Dome"—a rough equivalent of Israel's Iron Dome.

Because Britain is ten times the size of Israel, covering the entire country would be unrealistic. The idea would be to protect key assets and make the risk-to-reward ratio higher for Russia in deploying its own expensive assets.

Options include the Patriot system or the US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems, which could be integrated into the new European Sky Shield Initiative. The cost for Britain would be substantial. Professor Roberts told the Defence Committee:

We are in the realm of £20 billion, but it is not a one-off cost. The adversary develops new systems, increases the stealth capability of some of the missiles, and uses manoeuvring might defeat your current system, so it is a constant evolution.

The threat extends beyond military targets. Incidents of drones endangering aircraft and shutting down UK airports—historical and recent—demonstrate vulnerabilities. Similar events across Europe are viewed as grey zone attacks. Following the Gatwick and Heathrow shutdowns, the Home Office in conjunction with the Department for Transport produced the Government's "Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy." In 2024, the Department for Transport produced guidance on countering drone threats to shipping. The Home Office is responsible for bodies investigating illegal use of drones.

Professor Roberts highlighted any future threat would likely significantly affect the civilian population. Whereas the UK prioritises attacking military targets, Russia would view civilian national infrastructure as equally valuable. He told the committee:

There has been no political will to make the difficult decisions, or to be honest with the public and say, 'We're not going to stop missiles coming and hitting you. A set of you are going to die, hospitals are going to go under, and you will be without food, water, sewers and electricity.'

Russia might hide missiles inside a civilian container ship in the Channel, using them to cripple civilian gas terminals. As its actions in Ukraine have shown, today's Kremlin is not just interested in military targets, but the civilian infrastructure sapping Britain's will to fight. Professor Roberts warned Russia would aim

to hit the electricity supplying London... the banking sector and the natural gas port through which all our seven-day supply of gas comes. This is what [the Kremlin] is going after: the political will and freedom to act.

The Recruitment Catastrophe

Richard Mitchell, a former member of the Parachute regiment, said he joined after the 9/11 attacks when "they couldn't get people into the Para depot fast enough." However, he said, the morality of recent conflicts had been ambiguous.

Iraq was exposed as the big lie, and Afghanistan as a complete failure. Young people look back on recent history and worry the same will happen again.

Nick Reynolds, a military specialist at the Royal United Services Institute, said "military pay has stagnated compared to CPI inflation" with pay rises capped at 1% between 2013 and 2018. There have been higher increases in the last two years, at 3.75% and 5% plus £1,000, but the first was well below prevailing increases in the cost of living.

A significant proportion of military housing is substandard. Just over a year ago the military had to apologise for the poor state of its accommodation, with nearly a third of homes needing repair. Complaints of sexism and harassment have been reported across the forces in the past two years, from the Red Arrows to submarine crews.

The most acute questions centre around the recruitment process. Since Capita took over the army recruitment contract in 2012, the total shortfall is just over 23,000, according to Labour's calculations. "Demographic and cultural changes have been a challenge," Capita said in a statement, referring to concerns about whether young people believe a career in which an early death is theoretically possible is attractive.

The Royal Navy has faced issues with the number of vessels able to go to sea, with its fleet of attack submarines blighted by chronically poor availability. The Navy's support arm, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, has much of its fleet stuck in port. Questions have been raised over whether there are enough personnel to protect some of the UK's most sensitive military bases. In June 2025, activists from Palestine Action cut through the fence at RAF Brize Norton before causing £7 million of damage. The MOD described the action as "epically stupid" and "a direct attack on our national security."

There have been convictions for sabotage of businesses shipping supplies to Ukraine. MI5 has warned Russia "is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets: we've seen arson, sabotage and more." The Secretary of State told the committee there is a review ongoing examining:

the vulnerabilities and asking what sort of assurance we would need in place to reduce those vulnerabilities and the risks, and then the specific governance questions.

The China Problem

Leading British universities are helping China expand and modernise its military, despite persistent warnings from the UK and the US. Universities including Oxford and Cambridge are on a list of UK institutions having partnerships with China's top defence universities. The agreements allow Britain's top academics to assist China in researching new defence technology as well as training the next generation of China's military leaders.

Some co-operation is explicitly related to defence, whilst other parts cover civilian issues such as climate change and economics. However, experts say it doesn't matter what the subject is—the Chinese Communist Party will take advantage of expertise and technology from anywhere it can.

"Universities are sometimes naive in their understanding of how the People's Republic of China operates and they are often approaching things by being too open and blinded to the potential threat," said Sir Gavin Williamson, the Conservative MP who served as secretary of state for both education and defence.

Sometimes?

Many agreements involving British universities are with a group of leading Chinese military institutions known as the "Seven Sons of National Defence", founded with the sole purpose of expanding China's military capabilities. The Beijing Institute of Technology, responsible for developing China's first two-stage high altitude research rocket and first light tank, lists partnerships with at least five British universities, including with the University of Lancashire, which has been in place since 1998.

The University of Southampton runs a joint institute with the Harbin Engineering University, another of the "seven sons", known for research in submarines, underwater drones and naval power systems. The joint institute has produced research as recently as this year on how to improve unmanned aerial vehicles ground detection and better facilitate multi-ship coordination.

In 2021, a Bristol Robotics Laboratory researcher co-authored a study with Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics on improving coordination in UAV attacks. A year earlier, a lecturer at the London South Bank University collaborated with Northwestern Polytechnical University on optimising ship formations to maximise air-defence capabilities.

Approximately 70 Chinese universities are under the direct supervision of the country's primary defence agency, known as SASTIND (State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense), whilst others are managed by affiliate branches of the Chinese government or are part of state-owned defence conglomerates. Cambridge, Oxford and the London School of Economics are among universities having ongoing partnerships with SASTIND institutions, including with the prominent Tsinghua University.

Despite mounting pressure, the University of Leeds signed a new agreement in March 2025 with the University of Science and Technology Beijing. Whilst under the management of China's ministry of education, the institution openly advertises its role in achieving "historic breakthroughs in defence equipment projects." Oxford claims on its website to have trained "more than 10,000 Chinese government and university officials" through its different programmes and operates a centre at the Suzhou Industrial Park, a hub known for hosting companies with dual-use potential.

Cheryl Yu, a fellow in China studies at the US-based Jamestown Foundation, said Oxford's centre at Suzhou is a prime example of one of China's "offshore innovation bases"—sites China uses to:

bring foreign expertise and technology back to China" and support military, security and surveillance capabilities. Because these universities are integrated into the [CCP's] military-civil fusion system, any knowledge or technology shared through joint programs can ultimately be directed toward military use.

Yu was referring to a widespread strategy put in place by Xi Jinping to strengthen the military by maximising the civilian sector.

Cough. COVID-19. Cough.

Partnerships between British universities and China have also extended beyond military modernisation to include cooperation with sanctioned and restricted companies, including those directly involved in the persecution of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. More than 40 UK universities have been connected to Chinese institutions allegedly involved in mass crackdowns against the Uyghurs, labelled by human rights groups as genocide.

Huawei, one of China's leading technology companies, on the US trade blacklist since 2019 and linked to surveillance in Xinjiang, claims on its website to have had research partnerships with 20 British universities, including Cambridge, Oxford and Imperial College London. Imperial signed a £5 million agreement with Huawei in 2020, around the same time evidence of Huawei's work in Xinjiang first began to surface. Cambridge, which signed its £25 million partnership with Huawei in 2017, didn't end the partnership until 2022.

Over the past two years, the British Council claimed it generated over 40 new partnerships and a UK government report from 2021 found collaboration between British and Chinese universities had been increasing for decades before.

In 2022, MI5 and the FBI issued a joint warning against the growing threat of Chinese espionage efforts, but it hardly had an impact in Britain. In a report published in April 2025, The Times found 23 British universities signed agreements with at least one institution likely involved in Chinese military research since the MI5-FBI announcement. At least five of these agreements were signed with one of the "seven sons" universities.

NATO and the Failure of Article 3

The Strategic Defence Review sets out what Defence's NATO First approach would mean: prioritising the UK's "ability to contribute to NATO plans (including for defending the UK)"; ensuring NATO is part of all "policy, doctrine and concepts development, education and talent management"; and ensuring the range of UK activities "prioritises and enhances NATO objectives and integration."

However, the defence committee heard evidence calling into question whether the UK is living up to these commitments. Dr Johnson warned some NATO Allies had concerns about the UK's leadership. At a recent conference with Allies, there was,

a great deal of anxiety about the UK not providing the military, naval and air leadership all of them felt the UK, as a permanent member of the Security Council and a nuclear-armed power, should provide.

One American participant was

quite categorical the UK is not a tier 1 military power in the way its armed forces are currently configured.

Johnson went on to say "the UK is falling far short of its claimed leadership position" as if it wanted:

to defend its NATO partners in Europe and, indeed, in Canada and the United States, it simply does not have the mass, let alone the munitions, at the moment to do the job.

In response to a requirement for a rapid reaction force, the UK could likely only deploy 2,000 soldiers, 5-6 ships and 30 aircraft.

Ed Arnold of RUSI criticised the UK's leadership within NATO, noting it is failing to reach previously agreed capability targets within the NATO Defence Planning Process, explaining

the UK is already towards the bottom of the NDPP progress reports, and the government is being disingenuous to suggest all is harmonious between UK capability targets and NATO.

The committee found the UK is failing to meet its NATO obligations and falling "far short of its claimed leadership position." The report found the UK is "nowhere near" where it needs to be to defend itself and allies, especially at a time when security threats to Europe are "significant."

Europe's heavy reliance on the US in critical areas such as "intel, satellites, transportation of troops and air-to-air refuelling" was subject to critique in the report. It noted the UK had "next to nothing" when it came to integrated air and missile defences and pointed to recent drones encroaching on airspace across Europe as a way new technologies can threaten civilian populations in addition to military targets.

The Falklands Question and Beyond

When examining Britain's current military position: could the UK sustain itself in a conflict on its own? The defence committee's inquiry provides sobering answers. Dr Johnson told the committee the UK would struggle to deal with: a sub-threshold series of crises; a minor conflict involving a European Ally; or a full Article 5 conflict.

Whilst the Government could likely eventually manage the first scenario, for the latter two, the UK does "not have the capabilities we require."

Consider the scenario of another invasion of the Falklands. In 1982, Britain assembled a task force including two aircraft carriers, numerous destroyers and frigates, nuclear submarines, and thousands of troops. The expedition sailed 8,000 miles and recaptured the islands in a ten-week campaign. Could Britain do this today?

The lack of mass becomes critical. With slightly more than 70,000 fully trained soldiers, mounting an expeditionary force whilst maintaining homeland defence and NATO commitments would prove extraordinarily difficult. The munitions shortage compounds the problem—without domestic production at scale, sustaining a campaign 8,000 miles from home whilst simultaneously maintaining stockpiles for homeland defence would require total dependence on allies.

The committee heard repeatedly about the UK's lack of strategic enablers such as "space, electronic warfare or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance." These capabilities were assumed to be provided by NATO—meaning the US—if anything serious happened.

Taking NATO out of the equation reveals the stark reality.

A direct conflict with a peer or near-peer adversary would expose every weakness catalogued by the defence committee: insufficient munitions, inadequate air defence, recruitment shortfalls, industrial capacity gaps, and above all, lack of mass.

The Pace of Technocratic Vanity

The Government has announced numerous measures intended to address these deficiencies. The Strategic Defence Review, the National Security Strategy and the Defence Industrial Strategy all recognise the importance of resilience, readiness and industrial capacity. The creation of UK Defence Innovation, the SME Support Centre, the Office for Defence Exports and Defence Technical Colleges represent institutional responses - more quangoes.

The MOD will spend at least 10% of its equipment procurement budget on novel technologies. The Government intends to increase defence spending to a pitiful 3% of GDP by 2034 at the latest.

It's pathetic.

When in doubt, create a quango to look like you're doing something. When that doesn't work, spend some money.

The defence committee expressed "deep concern" at the "glacial pace" of promised improvements. Many announced measures are not yet in operation. ADS highlighted the need for "effective implementation" as the "game-changing" priority for the Defence Industrial Strategy, noting the previous such strategy in 2021

had some very sensible suggestions, the majority of which were not implemented.

The Strategic Defence Review envisioned UK Defence by 2035 would be a "leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated Force deters, fights and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace."

Yet the SDR provides no indication of what UK Defence should no longer do. Despite its terms of reference suggesting it would identify where "reprioritisation of roles, capabilities, activities and support may be made in the current Defence programme", the SDR gives no clarity on trade-offs. The Defence Investment Plan, expected to contain specific capability requirements and significant changes to the design of the UK Armed Forces, was due in autumn 2025. It remains unpublished.

The committee noted:

We are producing this Report prior to the publication of the Defence Investment Plan and as a result without the full picture of the future force posture. We timed this inquiry on the understanding by now there would be an indication of broad prioritisation, if not specific investment decisions—because these hard choices were not in the published SDR and have not been announced since, we cannot examine them yet.

The useless Defence Readiness Bill, recommended by the SDR as a central plank of Government efforts to build national resilience, would give the Government "powers in reserve to respond effectively in the event of escalation towards a war involving the UK or its allies." The then Minister for the Armed Forces told the committee key requirements and measures had... not yet been fully identified by Government.

The timetable for the Bill's introduction to Parliament cannot be established until this work has been completed. The defence committee welcomed the proposal but noted:

The Government has not yet determined what specific measures it wishes to include in the Bill, let alone written it.

General Lord Dannatt, the former head of the British Army, said the committee's report should act as a sobering "wake-up call."

We have piled risk on risk over the years, taken too many peace dividends since the end of the Cold War and we now stand in grave danger from Putin's Russia. The time to act is now. We are in the last chance saloon.

The Situation Is Worse Than Anyone Realises

The evidence assembled by the defence committee paints a picture of a nation sleepwalking towards vulnerability. Britain possesses nuclear weapons but lacks the conventional forces to deter grey zone aggression. It maintains world-class universities but permits them to train the next generation of Chinese military officers. It speaks of NATO leadership whilst failing to meet its Article 3 commitments. It promises warfighting readiness by 2035 whilst lacking a national defence plan today.

The specific deficiencies are well documented: missile defence next to nothing, munitions production restarting from scratch, recruitment 23,000 short of targets since 2012, industrial capacity hollowed out, homeland defence moving at glacial pace. Each weakness compounds the others.

Without munitions stockpiles, expeditionary operations become impossible. Without air defence, civilian infrastructure remains vulnerable. Without industrial capacity, sustained conflict becomes unthinkable. Without a national defence plan, coordination across government fails.

The committee's conclusion bears repeating:

Cross-government working on homeland defence and resilience is nowhere near where it needs to be. The Government has said repeatedly we are in an era of new threat, yet decision-making is slow and opaque.

Time is short, given the urgency of the threat and the work required to respond appropriately. The last chance saloon, as Lord Dannatt puts it, is where Britain now finds itself. Whether the nation possesses the political will to order another round—or walk out the door into the night—remains the question of our time.

Do we have to live out 1938 over and over and over, until infinity?