The Royal Court Of Inquiry Act: A Grand Jury Superinvestigator

For decades, they have haunted the national conscience. Hillsborough. Grenfell. The infected blood catastrophe. Grooming gangs operating with impunity while police looked away. Hundreds of innocent sub-postmasters prosecuted on the basis of computer evidence the Post Office knew to be flawed. Time and again, ordinary citizens have been failed by the institutions meant to protect them. Time and again, the powerful have escaped accountability through obstruction, classification, and the passage of time.

The Royal Court of Inquiry Act represents the most radical attempt in British constitutional history to break this pattern. This proposed legislation would establish an independent body with powers to investigate institutional wrongdoing on a scale never before attempted in peacetime Britain. Crucially, it would possess the authority to compel prosecution where evidence of criminality exists but prosecutors have inexplicably declined to act.

The Act creates not merely another inquiry mechanism but a permanent constitutional institution answerable to the Crown and Parliament yet independent of both. With powers to override government secrecy, penetrate the deepest recesses of state bureaucracy, and publish its findings without fear of suppression, the Royal Inquest would sit alongside Parliament and the Courts as a fundamental check on executive power.

What makes this legislation novel is not simply its ambition but its architecture. Every provision anticipates resistance. Every protection against interference carries criminal sanctions of up to twenty years imprisonment. Institutions created to investigate wrongdoing are typically strangled by the very forces they seek to expose. This Act attempts to make strangulation impossible.

Read the draft Royal Court Of Inquiry Act written by Alex Coppen in full here (108 pages):

The Royal Court Of Inquiry Act (DRAFT)

Royal Court Of Inquiry Act CHAPTER XX [DRAFT] A BILL to establish the Royal Court of Inquiry under Royal Charter for the investigation of institutional failures by public bodies causing serious harm to persons; to confer powers to compel evidence and override executive privilege and other immu…

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How the Royal Inquest Grand Jury Would Work

The Royal Court of Inquiry would comprise twelve Special Prosecutors serving ten-year terms and function as a "super-investigator" or "super-prosecutor" where Parliament and the Police have failed. These would not be establishment figures rotating through government sinecures. Appointees would require fifteen years' relevant experience and face a ten-year ban after holding political office or senior civil service positions. International recruitment would be actively encouraged, ensuring at least three members bring perspectives formed beyond Whitehall's corridors.

The appointment process itself creates multiple barriers against capture. The Judicial Appointments Commission nominates twenty candidates. A cross-party parliamentary committee must approve twelve by a two-thirds majority. Only then does the Prime Minister advise the King on appointments, and remarkably, if the Prime Minister refuses to appoint approved candidates, the Speaker of the House of Commons may advise the Crown directly.

Once appointed, Special Prosecutors become constitutionally untouchable. Removal requires a High Court finding of gross misconduct plus two-thirds majorities in both Houses of Parliament. Crucially, they cannot be removed for investigation decisions however controversial. This security of tenure extends to staff, creating a cadre of investigators beyond the reach of political pressure or career consequences.

The Inquest would maintain a published schedule of investigations. Matters reach this schedule through four routes: automatic triggers when public inquiries find institutional failure, citizen petitions backed by 100,000 signatures and credible evidence, parliamentary resolutions passed by two-thirds majorities across party lines, or the Inquest's own initiative. Each entry must demonstrate institutional failure causing serious harm to real victims, preventing the body from becoming a conspiracy theory clearing house or political weapon.

What distinguishes the Royal Inquest from previous inquiry mechanisms is permanence. This would not be a temporary commission established to investigate a single scandal then disbanded. It would be a standing institution perpetually vigilant against institutional wrongdoing, accumulating expertise and institutional memory, building precedents for accountability where none currently exist.

The Scandals Britain Refuses to Face

The Act's Schedule 2 lists twelve initial investigations, each representing a profound institutional betrayal. These are not allegations or theories but documented failures where authorities have already admitted wrongdoing yet accountability remains elusive.

The grooming gang scandal stands as perhaps the most devastating institutional failure in modern British history. Over more than twenty years, authorities estimate over a thousand children suffered sexual exploitation and trafficking in Rotherham, Rochdale, Telford, Oxford and numerous other locations. Police forces held evidence. Social services received reports. Yet investigations stalled, prosecutions failed to materialise, and victims found themselves disbelieved or blamed. The Jay Report's findings of cultural and organisational factors preventing effective response demand answers about who knew what, when they knew it, and why they chose inaction.

The infected blood catastrophe killed approximately three thousand people and infected thirty thousand more with HIV and hepatitis C during the 1970s and 1980s. People with haemophilia and other conditions received contaminated blood products from the NHS despite warnings about risks. The Infected Blood Inquiry documented how authorities ignored danger signals and subsequently destroyed documents concerning their decision-making. Victims and families have waited decades for criminal accountability.

Post Office Horizon prosecutions destroyed over seven hundred lives based on computer evidence Fujitsu and the Post Office knew to be flawed. Sub-postmasters went to prison, lost their businesses, faced bankruptcy and social ostracism. Several took their own lives. The institution prosecuted people it knew might be innocent, concealed exculpatory evidence, and fought appeals for years. Senior executives have faced no criminal consequences.

Hillsborough's ninety-seven deaths stemmed not from crowd behaviour but from police failures and subsequent cover-up. South Yorkshire Police altered witness statements, briefed media to blame victims, and maintained this fiction for over twenty years. Despite the Hillsborough Independent Panel's devastating findings, criminal prosecutions have largely failed. The families' prolonged fight for truth exemplifies how institutional obstruction can defer justice indefinitely.

Stephen Lawrence's 1993 murder exposed institutional racism in the Metropolitan Police. The Macpherson Report documented investigative failures so profound they appeared to constitute wilful negligence. Allegations of corruption persist. Killers walked free for nearly two decades whilst the Lawrence family faced dismissal and obstruction. Similar patterns emerge across cases involving minority victims.

Grenfell Tower's seventy-two deaths resulted from a chain of institutional failures. The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, the tenant management organisation, contractors, building control authorities and fire services all failed. Residents' safety concerns were ignored. Combustible cladding was installed despite known risks. Years after the fire, residents question whether those responsible will face meaningful consequences.

The Windrush scandal saw the Home Office wrongly classify thousands of long-term Caribbean-origin residents as illegal immigrants. The department destroyed landing cards proving lawful residence, then detained, deported and denied healthcare to people who had lived legally in Britain for decades. Several died after being denied medical treatment. Evidence suggests officials ignored warnings about the policy's impact whilst implementing their "hostile environment" agenda.

These represent a fraction of Schedule 2's scope. The Daniel Morgan murder investigation foundered amid evidence of Metropolitan Police corruption. Undercover policing operations saw officers deceive women into sexual relationships and spy on grieving families. Each scandal shares common features: institutional failure, harm to vulnerable people, cover-up, obstruction, and absence of criminal accountability.

Accountability At Scale

The Royal Court of Inquiry Act comprises twelve Parts, each addressing a critical aspect of investigative power, institutional protection, or constitutional entrenchment. Together, these provisions construct an institution designed to resist the forces that have historically neutralised oversight bodies. The following breakdown examines how each Part contributes to creating an investigative mechanism capable of penetrating institutional secrecy, withstanding political pressure, and delivering accountability where previous efforts have failed.

Part 1: Constitutional Foundation and Independence

The Act's opening sections establish the Royal Inquest's constitutional status with unusual force. Section 2 declares the body "not subject to the direction or control of any Minister of the Crown, government department, or any other person or body." This might seem routine boilerplate. The subsequent provisions demonstrate otherwise.

Ministers, MPs, civil servants and public officials are explicitly forbidden from attempting to influence investigations. Any such contact must be published within twenty-four hours. Section 43 makes it a criminal offence punishable by ten years imprisonment to exert improper pressure. The zero-contact rule extends beyond formal communications to encompass threats, promises and any form of inducement through indirect means.

The Royal Charter mechanism deserves attention. His Majesty grants a Charter within sixty days of commencement, conferring constitutional dignity on the institution. Critically, the Charter cannot be amended or revoked without the Inquest's own consent expressed by two-thirds of the Grand Jury. This creates a constitutional lock preventing politicians from quietly neutering the body through administrative changes.

Section 3 defines the statutory purpose with precision. The Inquest exists to investigate institutional failures causing serious harm, establish facts, identify responsible persons, refer criminal evidence to prosecutors, and promote accountability through transparency. The emphasis on "ordinary people" who "lacked power, resources, or effective voice" ensures focus remains on systemic failures affecting the vulnerable rather than elite disputes.

Definitions matter enormously in legislation prone to hostile interpretation. Section 4 defines institutional failure empirically: systemic negligence, deliberate concealment, coordinated obstruction, persistent disregard for evidence of harm lasting over twelve months, or failure causing serious harm to at least ten persons or identifiable community groups. This specificity prevents authorities claiming isolated incidents or individual bad actors absolve institutions of responsibility.

Similarly, "serious harm" receives concrete definition: death, serious bodily injury, mental illness meeting WHO diagnostic criteria, sexual abuse, deprivation of liberty, financial loss exceeding £10,000 per person, systematic rights deprivations, or foreseeable risk of such harms. Vague notions of "reputational damage" or "public confidence" cannot substitute for demonstrable harm to real people.

The purposive interpretation principle running through Part 1 instructs courts to resolve ambiguities in favour of promoting accountability and protecting investigative independence. This reverses the typical judicial deference to executive claims of necessity or privilege. The Act explicitly states its intention: institutions that have failed citizens must be held to account.

Part 2: Appointments Designed to Resist Capture

Institutional design determines institutional outcomes. History demonstrates that bodies intended to investigate wrongdoing typically succumb to one of three fates: they are captured by those they should investigate, they are starved of resources until ineffective, or they are abolished when they threaten powerful interests. Part 2's appointment architecture attempts to prevent all three.

The three-stage filtered process creates multiple veto points against unsuitable candidates. The Judicial Appointments Commission cannot be leaned on by ministers since it operates independently. The cross-party parliamentary committee cannot be controlled by a single party since approval requires two-thirds support. This means any controversial appointment must command genuine cross-party consensus, making it nearly impossible to plant loyalists or block troublesome candidates without revealing political motivation.

The ten-year non-renewable term is crucial. Renewable terms create incentives to please those who control reappointment. Non-renewable terms eliminate this pressure. Special Prosecutors can pursue investigations knowing their tenure cannot be shortened and that courting favour gains them nothing. Combined with staggered terms ensuring only three positions expire every thirty months, this prevents wholesale replacement or packing of the Inquest by any government.

Section 6's eligibility requirements deliberately exclude the Whitehall establishment. The ten-year cooling-off period for politicians and senior civil servants prevents revolving-door appointments where tomorrow's investigators are yesterday's ministers or mandarins. The preference for international experience introduces perspectives unformed by British institutional culture. Having spent fifteen years in Australian prosecution services or Canadian criminal investigation brings different assumptions about what constitutes acceptable institutional behaviour.

The removal provisions demonstrate the protection's strength. Gross misconduct must be found by the High Court, meaning independent judges not politicians make the initial determination. Even then, two-thirds parliamentary majorities are required. Crucially, investigation decisions cannot constitute grounds for removal. A Special Prosecutor who investigates the Prime Minister's office, finds against the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, or publishes findings embarrassing to powerful interests cannot be removed merely for doing so.

Security of tenure extends to staff, preventing the subtle pressure of career consequences. Investigators need not fear that pursuing a particular line of inquiry will see them sidelined, demoted, or denied promotion. The prohibition on employing recent government department staff prevents infiltration by those still culturally aligned with institutions under investigation.

Section 9's practical protections matter as much as constitutional ones. Independent premises not in government buildings. Private security not Metropolitan Police protection. IT systems beyond GCHQ access. These operational details prevent subtle forms of monitoring, influence, or obstruction. An investigator working in government buildings, protected by government security, using government IT systems can never fully escape the sense of being observed.

Part 3: Powers Without Precedent in Peacetime Britain

The investigative powers in Part 3 approach wartime emergency authorities in scope whilst being bounded by judicial oversight and transparent deployment. Section 10's power to compel testimony extends to everyone except the reigning Monarch, including Royals, ministers, senior civil servants, serving police officers, intelligence operatives and retired officials. No rank, no office, no constitutional convention provides exemption.

More significantly, all privileges traditionally protecting government from scrutiny are abolished for Inquest investigations. Executive privilege, Crown privilege, Cabinet confidentiality, legal professional privilege for government lawyers, public interest immunity, parliamentary privilege—all void. This sweeps away the mechanisms through which previous inquiries have been stymied. When the Scott Inquiry investigated arms to Iraq, government claims of public interest immunity prevented access to crucial documents. When Leveson investigated press standards, claims of journalistic privilege limited scope. The Royal Inquest would face no such obstacles.

The David Kelly provision in Section 13 addresses one of the most notorious abuses of archive classification. Kelly, the weapons inspector whose death followed the Iraq War controversy, had documents relating to his case classified for seventy years—a period ensuring everyone involved would be dead before truth emerged. The Act renders all such extended closure periods void. Any government record subject to closure exceeding thirty years automatically becomes reviewable and publishable by the Inquest.

Section 12's direct access to government IT systems eliminates a key obstruction mechanism. Previous investigations have foundered on civil servants acting as gatekeepers, "unable to locate" documents, providing incomplete sets of emails with convenient deletions, or claiming technical difficulties in retrieving electronic records. The Inquest receives system credentials and searches databases itself without civil servants present. Every access and modification gets logged in audit trails the Inquest controls, making future "accidental" deletions impossible to hide.

Document protection provisions activate automatically when investigation is announced. From that moment, destroying, altering or concealing relevant records becomes a criminal offence carrying fourteen years imprisonment. The presumption reverses: if documents disappear after investigation commences, the custodian is presumed to have acted unlawfully unless they can prove otherwise. Senior officials become personally liable, eliminating the defence of collective institutional responsibility.

Section 15's three-tier intelligence classification system breaks the intelligence services' monopoly on secrecy. Tier One material—operations over thirty years old, concluded operations, material on deceased persons—receives no protection. Tier Two requires judicial warrant. Tier Three, covering only active operations where disclosure would cause death or irreversible capability damage, can be temporarily withheld but faces mandatory judicial review every three months and absolute five-year declassification.

Critically, Section 16 criminalises classification to conceal wrongdoing. Slapping "secret" stamps on documents to hide criminal conduct or institutional failure becomes itself an offence punishable by fifteen years imprisonment. The burden shifts: intelligence services must prove classification serves genuine security rather than merely protecting reputations or avoiding embarrassment.

Royal persons lose immunity under Section 17. Prince Andrew can be compelled to testify. Royal household records become accessible. Royal finances face scrutiny. The explicit removal of Crown immunity reverses centuries of convention protecting the Royal Family from investigation. Only the Sovereign retains immunity from prosecution, though even the reigning Monarch can be investigated and findings can be published.

Section 18's overseas territories jurisdiction targets a longstanding accountability gap. British Overseas Territories, particularly Cayman Islands and British Virgin Islands, have facilitated vast money laundering operations through structures exploiting gaps between UK and local jurisdiction. The Act extends powers directly to OTs, compels local governments to cooperate, and makes UK reserve powers enforceable for non-cooperation. Similar provisions cover Crown Dependencies like Jersey and Guernsey, ending their use as convenient places to hide financial wrongdoing.

Part 4: Scope and Scheduling—Preventing Weaponisation

Powers this extensive demand careful scope definition preventing abuse. Part 4 establishes multiple filters ensuring the Inquest investigates genuine institutional failures harming ordinary people rather than becoming a political weapon or conspiracy theory forum.

Section 19's statutory test requires institutional failure plus serious harm. Individual cases of misconduct, however egregious, fall outside scope unless they reveal systematic patterns. Policy disagreements, however passionately felt, cannot become investigation subjects. The "ordinary people" priority test focuses resources on cases where victims lacked power to obtain justice through existing processes.

Section 20's prohibited grounds merit close attention. The Inquest cannot investigate based solely on political party membership or protected characteristics. It cannot pursue conspiracy theories unsupported by credible evidence. Individual grievances where adequate legal remedies exist are excluded. This prevents the body becoming a court of last resort for every disappointed litigant or a platform for political vendettas dressed as corruption investigations.

The citizen petition route requires 100,000 signatures plus documentary evidence plus independent panel assessment. This three-stage filter eliminates frivolous campaigns whilst ensuring matters of genuine public concern receive attention. The Evidence Assessment Panel can summarily dismiss petitions manifestly lacking credible evidence, with such dismissals being final and not subject to appeal.

Automatic triggers in Schedule 1 ensure major institutional failures don't require petition campaigns to gain attention. When public inquiries find institutional wrongdoing, when coroners return unlawful killing verdicts implicating officials, when courts find systematic corruption—these automatically become investigation subjects. The Act creates duties to investigate rather than leaving such matters to discretion.

Schedule 2's template for investigation entries prevents vague or open-ended mandates. Each matter must specify victim numbers, institutions involved, nature of harm, evidence of institutional failure, timeframe, and why existing investigations proved inadequate. This forces precision from the outset, helping both the Inquest and the public understand what each investigation seeks to establish.

The prohibition on removing schedule entries except by Grand Jury resolution protects ongoing investigations from political interference. A government embarrassed by preliminary findings cannot pressure the Inquest to drop the matter. Once scheduled, investigation proceeds until the Inquest itself determines it has fulfilled its remit.

Part 5: Making Prosecutors Prosecute

Part 5 introduces the most constitutionally radical element: power to compel prosecution authorities to bring charges despite their expressed unwillingness. This breaks the centuries-old principle of unfettered prosecutorial discretion, replacing it with judicial oversight when prosecutors appear to have abandoned their responsibilities.

The standard process operates normally. The Inquest delivers complete evidence packages to the Crown Prosecution Service with detailed analysis showing which evidence proves which elements of alleged offences. The CPS receives ninety days to decide whether to prosecute. If declining, it must publish detailed reasoning explaining why evidence is insufficient or prosecution not in the public interest.

Mandatory Prosecution Orders operate when this process fails. If the CPS declines to prosecute or simply ignores the referral, the Inquest can apply to the Special Prosecution Court for an order compelling prosecution. This three-judge panel of Court of Appeal level jurists assesses whether evidence meets the standard for a reasonable jury to convict and whether the CPS decision refusing prosecution is manifestly unreasonable.

The test is deliberately high. The SPC cannot simply substitute its judgment for the CPS's normal prosecutorial discretion. It must find the evidence sufficient and the refusal manifestly unreasonable. This limits intervention to cases where prosecutors have clearly abandoned their responsibilities, not merely made debatable judgment calls.

The annual cap of ten Mandatory Prosecution Orders prevents overuse whilst ensuring the mechanism remains available for the most serious cases. The Inquest must prioritise, choosing carefully which declinations warrant judicial intervention. This scarcity forces strategic deployment rather than routine challenge of every prosecutorial decision.

Section 31's provisions addressing obstruction within prosecution are crucial. If the CPS agrees to prosecute under compulsion then conducts the case in bad faith seeking acquittal, the SPC can appoint a special prosecutor to take over. If the CPS refuses to comply with a Mandatory Prosecution Order, it faces contempt of court proceedings. The Act anticipates resistance and creates mechanisms to overcome it.

The scenario described in project notes crystallises the mechanism's purpose. Evidence emerges of fifty councillors involved in grooming gang facilitation. The CPS, dominated by officials sharing political sympathies with the accused, declines prosecution citing technical insufficiency or public interest considerations. The Inquest applies for an MPO. The SPC reviews evidence in detail, determines it meets criminal standards, finds the CPS reasoning manifestly inadequate, and orders prosecution. The CPS must comply or face contempt.

Critics will argue this undermines prosecutorial independence. Defenders respond that independence presumes good faith exercise of judgment, not immunity from accountability when prosecutors appear to protect politically connected wrongdoers. The judicial oversight means politicians do not compel prosecutions; courts do, based on evidence review and assessment of prosecutorial reasoning.

Part 6: Publication and the Impossibility of Suppression

Part 6's publication duties transform the Royal Inquest from investigator to transparency engine. Findings must be published within thirty days of completion. Evidence packages receive publication alongside conclusions, enabling public verification rather than requiring trust in the Inquest's analysis. This reverses the typical inquiry model where evidence remains sealed and only anodyne summaries reach public view.

Section 33's prohibition on injunctions preventing publication removes the primary tool for suppressing uncomfortable truths. Courts cannot grant interim relief blocking publication save in extreme circumstances creating immediate risk to life or national security. Damage to reputation, political embarrassment, or potential prejudice to fair trial cannot justify suppression. The presumption reverses: publication proceeds unless compelling specific grounds exist to prevent it.

Parliamentary privilege provisions ensure findings cannot be buried through procedural manoeuvres. Reports must be laid before Parliament, receive absolute privilege against defamation claims, and face mandatory debate within thirty days. No government can use its majority to prevent parliamentary consideration. The concurrent public release means citizens access findings simultaneously with parliamentarians, preventing filtered or spun versions reaching public consciousness first.

Section 36 criminalises suppression attempts. Applying for injunctions to prevent publication, threatening legal action to deter publication, pressuring Inquest members to withhold findings—all become criminal offences punishable by ten years imprisonment. This makes obstruction personally dangerous for those who might otherwise deploy legal threats to delay or prevent disclosure.

The international publication backstop in Section 37 addresses the possibility of successful domestic suppression despite these protections. The Inquest transmits findings simultaneously to publication partners in at least three foreign jurisdictions with strong press freedom protections. If UK publication is blocked, these partners release the material through means accessible to UK residents. Treaty obligations require foreign governments to resist UK pressure to prevent such publication.

This creates a "nuclear option" for transparency. A government might conceivably marshal courts, media pressure and legal threats sufficient to prevent UK publication. It cannot prevent publication in Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada simultaneously whilst maintaining treaty relationships with those nations. The automatic international release mechanism ensures suppression requires abandoning international cooperation and suffering severe reputational consequences.

Redaction rules permit minimal withholding. Child identities can be protected. Intelligence sources facing death can receive temporary shielding. Nothing else qualifies. Political embarrassment, institutional reputation, official sensitivity—none justify redaction. Even permitted redactions face automatic five-year sunset requiring positive judicial extension if still necessary.

Part 7: Criminal Protection Against Interference

If Parts 1 through 6 establish powers and duties, Part 7 enforces them through criminal sanctions making interference prohibitively dangerous. Section 38's basic obstruction offences cover providing false information, concealing documents, destroying evidence, refusing to comply with requirements, and improperly influencing witnesses. Each carries fourteen years imprisonment.

Section 39 creates aggravated offences for public officials who abuse their positions to obstruct investigations. Using official authority to issue directions preventing cooperation, classifying documents to conceal them, coordinating institutional resistance—these earn twenty years imprisonment plus lifetime disqualification from public office. The disqualification becomes publicly registered, ensuring no one rehabilitates their reputation and returns to positions of trust.

Institutional liability under Section 40 recognises that bodies corporate can be structured to diffuse individual responsibility whilst maintaining collective obstruction. Where institutional culture or policies facilitate obstruction, the body itself faces unlimited fines. Courts can order remedial measures, with daily fines for non-compliance. A public register records all institutional convictions, creating permanent reputational consequences.

Section 41 establishes presumptions reversing normal burden of proof for document destruction. Once investigation is announced, destroying relevant documents becomes presumptively criminal. The custodian must prove destruction was accidental or unrelated to the investigation. This eliminates the "unfortunate coincidence" defence where smoking-gun documents mysteriously disappear just as investigators approach.

The zero-contact rule in Section 43 operationalises independence. Ministers and officials cannot discuss ongoing investigations with the Inquest. Any contact for legitimate purposes must be recorded and published within twenty-four hours. Improper pressure through indirect means—threats, promises, inducements—becomes criminal. This forces all government interaction with the Inquest into the open where it can be scrutinised.

Whistleblower protections in Section 44 eliminate the career consequences that typically deter reporting wrongdoing. Staff who provide evidence to the Inquest cannot be dismissed, disciplined, or disadvantaged. Any such retaliation becomes criminal, carrying seven years imprisonment for police officers or public officials. Civil remedies include compensation and reinstatement orders. The burden shifts: once someone proves they cooperated with the Inquest then suffered detriment, employers must prove the detriment was unrelated.

Practically, these provisions create what project notes call the "iron ring"—a structure of criminal sanctions making every form of obstruction personally dangerous. Civil servants cannot "lose" documents without risking fourteen years imprisonment. Ministers cannot pressure the Inquest without committing criminal offences. Prosecutors cannot bury evidence without facing mandatory prosecution order applications. At every point, interference carries consequences severe enough to deter all but the most reckless.

Part 8: National Security

Part 8 addresses the inevitable tension between transparency and genuine security needs. The approach rejects blank cheque national security exemptions in favour of narrowly defined, judicially supervised, time-limited withholding.

Section 45 permits temporary publication delay only for Tier Three intelligence material creating immediate specific risks: death of identified individuals, compromise of active sources or methods, or grave irreversible capability damage. A High Court judge must certify these risks exist, specifying exactly which evidence is affected and why. The certificate lasts maximum twelve months, requires quarterly judicial review, and faces absolute five-year sunset regardless of circumstances.

The immediate risk exception in Section 48 acknowledges genuinely urgent situations. Intelligence chiefs can certify evidence creates immediate death risk or would compromise imminent counter-terrorism operations, delaying publication fourteen days without judicial approval. Within forty-eight hours, an independent judicial reviewer examines the evidence and can order immediate publication if unconvinced. Even if confirmed, delay cannot exceed six months total.

Critically, Section 47 prohibits using national security classification to conceal wrongdoing, protect individuals, avoid embarrassment, or prevent prosecution. Any classification for these purposes is void. The Royal Inquest can disregard it and publish. The person imposing such classification faces fifteen years imprisonment. This eliminates the traditional practice of reflexively classifying anything potentially awkward.

The independent judicial reviewer in Section 49 provides continuous oversight. Appointed for three years by the Lord Chief Justice, this Court of Appeal or High Court judge monitors all classification decisions affecting investigations. The reviewer accesses all classified material including that withheld from the Inquest, determines whether national security claims are legitimate, and reports annually to Parliament on any concerning patterns.

Section 50 makes the Supreme Court final arbiter. Any dispute over classification goes to a panel of at least five justices who see all classified material, assess whether withholding is justified, and can order immediate publication. No further appeal lies from this decision. This prevents endless litigation cycles where intelligence services appeal adverse decisions through multiple court levels.

The five-year absolute sunset deserves emphasis. No evidence can be withheld beyond five years regardless of sensitivity. This prevents the David Kelly situation where seventy-year classifications ensure truth emerges only after everyone involved has died. Intelligence services must accept that operational secrets eventually become historical record. The gradual declassification timeline gives operational concerns reasonable protection whilst ensuring accountability cannot be infinitely deferred.

The architecture respects genuine security whilst rejecting reflexive secrecy. Genuinely active operations receive short-term protection. Sources facing immediate danger get temporary shielding. Beyond these narrow circumstances, classified status provides no defence against investigation or publication. The burden lies on intelligence services to prove specific grave harm, not on the Inquest to prove classification is unnecessary.

Part 9: Financial Independence and Operational Autonomy

Strangling through the purse strings represents the most reliable method for neutralising inconvenient oversight bodies. Part 9 eliminates this vulnerability through constitutional guarantees rendering the Royal Inquest financially immune to political displeasure. The funding formula operates with mathematical simplicity: one-tenth of one per cent of total government expenditure, calculated automatically and paid quarterly from the Consolidated Fund without requiring parliamentary votes. This arrangement scales resources proportionally to government size whilst removing the annual appropriation ritual where politicians could reduce allocations to punish unwelcome investigations.

Multi-year settlements extending five years enable strategic planning beyond electoral cycles. Parliament cannot reduce funding to levels preventing the Inquest from discharging its statutory duties without two-thirds majorities in both Houses. Where the Inquest determines funding is insufficient, it reports this to Parliament with detailed resource requirements. Parliament must then either provide supplementary funding or reduce the investigation schedule to match available resources, forcing explicit political choices about which scandals will not be investigated.

The operational autonomy provisions address subtler forms of control. The Inquest occupies premises outside the government estate, employs private security rather than Metropolitan Police protection, and operates entirely separate IT networks beyond GCHQ reach. Evidence storage occurs partly on servers in foreign jurisdictions, protected by legal systems where UK government writs do not run. The Inquest need not use Government Digital Service, Government Property Agency, or any centralised provider, contracting directly with private suppliers chosen for capability rather than political connections.

Independent audit arrangements ensure financial propriety without creating leverage points. Auditors are appointed by the Inquest itself, must have no connection to the National Audit Office or government departments, and examine economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Critically, they cannot examine investigation decisions—matters of judgment about which scandals to investigate, how to conduct them, or what findings to publish remain beyond audit scope.

These provisions collectively create financial and operational independence approaching that of the judiciary. Just as judges need not fear budget retaliation for unwelcome judgments, investigators need not fear funding cuts for unwelcome findings. The resources flow according to constitutional formula, insulated from political manipulation, enabling the Inquest to pursue truth wherever it leads without calculating the financial consequences of crossing powerful interests.

Part 10: Accountability Without Control

Independence requires accountability lest it become mere unaccountable power. Part 10 constructs oversight mechanisms ensuring the Inquest remains faithful to its statutory purpose whilst preventing such oversight from becoming disguised control. Annual reporting to Parliament provides comprehensive transparency, detailing all investigations commenced and completed, principal findings, evidence packages referred to prosecutors and outcomes, applications for mandatory prosecution orders, use of compulsory powers, and any contacts from ministers potentially violating the zero-contact rule. Parliamentary debate occurs within thirty days, with government ministers required to respond.

Judicial review provisions acknowledge courts' role in preventing abuse of power whilst constraining grounds for challenge. Review is available only for jurisdictional errors, procedural impropriety constituting denial of natural justice, manifest irrationality, or bad faith. Courts cannot second-guess prioritisation choices or substitute judicial judgment for investigative judgment about evidence weight or witness credibility. Crucially, persons under investigation lack standing to challenge investigation decisions save on the narrow statutory grounds, preventing targets from using judicial review as a delaying tactic.

The triennial review by five senior judges provides expert external assessment without creating supervisory control. The reviewing panel accesses all Inquest documents including those relating to uncompleted investigations, examines whether investigations have been conducted fairly and thoroughly, and assesses whether resources focus appropriately on matters meeting statutory criteria. The panel cannot examine the merits of particular findings, cannot second-guess evidence weighting, and possesses no power to direct investigation commencement, discontinuance or alteration.

Restrictions on interim relief prevent courts from halting investigations or publications through injunctive orders. Interim relief requires showing the investigation or publication would be unlawful and that irreparable harm would result without intervention. Reputational damage does not constitute irreparable harm. Political embarrassment provides no basis. The requirement that interim applications be heard by Divisional Courts comprising at least two High Court judges, determined within fourteen days, ensures swift resolution without permitting single judges to halt investigations through emergency orders.

This architecture preserves independence whilst ensuring the Inquest cannot become a rogue institution pursuing vendettas or abandoning its statutory purpose. Parliament receives regular comprehensive reporting enabling political accountability. Courts can prevent jurisdictional overreach and procedural unfairness. Senior judges conduct periodic reviews assessing institutional performance. Yet none of these mechanisms permit external direction of which matters to investigate, how to conduct investigations, what findings to reach, or what to publish.

Part 11: Entrenchment Against Future Governments

Parliamentary sovereignty presents an inescapable problem for any attempt to bind future Parliaments. Part 11 acknowledges this reality whilst constructing obstacles making amendment or abolition politically costly enough to deter all but the most determined assaults on institutional accountability. Section 63's super-majority requirement establishes the first barrier: any amendment or repeal needs two-thirds majorities in both Commons and Lords. The mandatory pre-legislative statement explaining amendment rationales and consequences creates sunshine as disinfectant, with independent assessment published six months before any vote enabling informed parliamentary and public debate about true motivations.

The referendum requirement for substantial power reductions creates a further hurdle. Removing investigative powers, reducing funding formulae, restricting investigation scope, or weakening interference protections cannot occur without popular approval. This transforms the question from whether Parliament supports changes to whether the electorate does, raising stakes dramatically. The constitutional statute designation invokes principles established in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council, meaning the Act cannot be impliedly amended or repealed—any changes must be express and unambiguous, preventing slow erosion through thousands of small legislative changes never explicitly addressing the Royal Inquest Act.

International dimensions create external pressures against dismantling. Section 65 requires treaties with at least three foreign states committing them to support the Inquest's work, facilitate publication if domestic suppression occurs, and treat Inquest abolition or significant weakening as retrogressive step affecting bilateral relations. Section 66's international evidence archive provisions ensure copies of all evidence are stored securely in multiple foreign jurisdictions with automatic release triggers if the Inquest is abolished or systematically obstructed. This creates a nuclear option for transparency: a government might conceivably suppress UK publication, but cannot prevent simultaneous release in Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada without abandoning international cooperation.

The ten-year sunset provisions on all limitations and exemptions reverse normal legislative dynamics. Any provision restricting Inquest powers automatically expires after ten years unless renewed by two-thirds parliamentary majorities following fresh justification. The default becomes full powers rather than restricted powers, forcing each generation to affirmatively choose continued limitations rather than permitting restrictions to persist through inertia.

These protections cannot make the Act unamendable under parliamentary sovereignty, but they make amendment extremely costly politically. A government wishing to weaken the Inquest must marshal two-thirds parliamentary majorities, justify changes in public consultation, possibly win a referendum, and accept international consequences including potential evidence release and treaty violations. The political costs become severe enough that casual interference becomes impossible, requiring sustained determination to overcome multiple constitutional obstacles designed to force reflection on whether abandoning institutional accountability truly serves the public interest.

Part 12: Final Provisions

Part 12 addresses interpretative questions, consequential amendments to existing legislation, transitional arrangements, and the Act's temporal and geographic scope. Section 69's definitions provide precision on key terms whose meanings might otherwise become battlegrounds for obstruction. Section 70's purposive interpretation principle instructs courts to resolve ambiguities in favour of promoting accountability, protecting independence, and ensuring transparency—reversing typical judicial deference to executive claims of privilege or necessity.

Consequential amendments to the Public Records Act 1958, Freedom of Information Act 2000, Official Secrets Act 1989, and Data Protection Act 2018 ensure the Royal Inquest's powers override existing statutory restrictions on access and disclosure. Archive closure periods, FOI exemptions, official secrets protections, and data protection limitations all yield to investigative requirements. These amendments eliminate potential conflicts where other statutes might be interpreted to prevent the Inquest from exercising powers granted by its enabling Act. The general repeal provision in Section 75 sweeps away any other statutory obstacles including Crown immunity, executive privilege, and public interest immunity in relation to Inquest investigations.

Transitional provisions address the passage from current arrangements to full operation. Ongoing public inquiries can have their materials transferred to the Inquest, which may continue investigations or determine they are complete. Initial appointments to the Grand Jury occur within six months of commencement using the standard process but with staggered terms ensuring continuity. Schedule 2's initial investigation matters are automatically added to the schedule upon commencement, with preliminary assessments and priority statements published within twelve months.

Crown application and extent provisions bind the Crown to all Act requirements whilst preserving the constitutional position that the Sovereign cannot be prosecuted. The Act extends throughout the United Kingdom and to all British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies, with extraterritorial application where substantial UK connections exist. Orders in Council may provide for modified implementation in Overseas Territories including establishment of local offices or representatives.

Commencement occurs in phases. Establishment provisions, funding arrangements, and transitional provisions take effect upon Royal Assent. Investigative powers and scope provisions commence within twelve months. Prosecution referral and mandatory prosecution order provisions commence within eighteen months. All other provisions commence within two years. This staged implementation permits the Inquest to establish itself institutionally before wielding full powers, reducing the risk of early missteps that might undermine public confidence in this unprecedented constitutional experiment in enforced governmental accountability.

A Gamble on Institutional Honesty

The Royal Court of Inquiry Act represents an extraordinary constitutional gamble. It bets that Parliament can be persuaded to create an institution with genuine power to investigate parliamentary wrongdoing. It bets that ministers will vote for mechanisms compelling them to answer questions they would prefer to avoid. It bets that civil servants will facilitate building systems enabling scrutiny of their own conduct. It bets, in short, that turkeys might under certain circumstances vote for Christmas.

History suggests such bets typically fail. Powerful institutions do not voluntarily submit to accountability.

Yet the question posed by this legislation is not whether it could pass in current circumstances but whether circumstances might arise making it politically necessary. Trust in institutions has been declining for decades. Each scandal—Hillsborough, Grenfell, infected blood, Post Office prosecutions—deepens public cynicism about whether justice applies equally to powerful wrongdoers. Eventually, political survival might require demonstrating willingness to face institutional failures honestly.

The Act offers a comprehensive framework for such reckoning. Its twelve Parts construct an institution designed to resist capture, equipped with powers to penetrate secrecy, protected from interference through criminal sanctions, required to publish transparently, and capable of compelling prosecution when prosecutors abandon their duties. Whether Britain would actually establish such an institution remains to be seen.

What cannot be doubted is that the institutional failures documented in Schedule 2 demand accountability. Thousands have died, been wrongly convicted, or suffered abuse whilst authorities looked away. Some pattern must break. Either institutions reform themselves, demonstrating capacity for honest self-examination and willingness to hold their own to account, or external mechanisms become necessary. The Royal Court of Inquiry Act proposes one such mechanism. Whether Britain possesses the political courage to implement it will reveal much about the nation's commitment to justice beyond rhetoric.